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Group Defamation in the U. S. A.
James Jay Brown* and Carl L. Stern"
A N ALMOST FATALISTIC ATTITUDE of laissez faire seems to be
the controlling influence on the development (or lack of
development) of American group defamation law. As a result,
many large groups of people, usually racial or religious minori-
ties, cannot recover for even the vilest attacks on them. The
reasons for this are said to be such exasperating ones as the
vague limits of free speech, the difficulty of proving injury to a
particular person in the group, the probability of multiple suits,
and the inexactness of interests among the group members.'
Even professional defamers are, today, insulated and protected
by our laws from civil liability, as long as their words or actions
remain "wholesale" defamation 2 and do not single out specific
individuals or numerically small groups.
Public policy, that ancient legal justification for needed ac-
tion, may be the only potent counter force to resolve this di-
lemma, today. In a very recent announcement, for example,
insurance against civil liability for discrimination based on race,
creed, color or national origin was barred in New York as being
against public policy.3 If our courts and legislatures are sup-
posed to mirror contemporary mores and developments of our
society, how can it be that public policy so clearly is far ahead
of them?
The problem of unrestricted wholesale libel or slander is il-
luminated when it is realized that "popular opinion is far more
readily built up on rumors and impressions than on objectively
observed facts." 4
Each year hate publications find their way into at least
half a million American homes, and well over 2 million per-
sons read them. The original statements of these hate-sellers
* B.Sc., Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsyl-
vania; Junior Executive with a Cleveland realty and construction company;
Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
** A.B., M.S., Columbia University; Broadcast Journalist, Westinghouse
Broadcasting (KYW-TV), Cleveland; Second-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 423, 430 (1952).
2 Note, Marr v. Putnam, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 144 (1953).
3 N. Y. State Ins. Dept. Ruling by Dept. Supt. N. G. Alford, Jr., reported in
New York Times, p. 1 (Sept. 30, 1963).
4 Loewenstein, Christians and Jews, 126 (Internatl. Univ. Press, 1951).
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are repeated in whispers and soon gain circulation. In this
way the lies frequently become the "facts"-the initial source
of which no one remembers, but everyone recognizes as
"having heard somewhere before." As the creators of many
public misconceptions, therefore, these propagandists can-
not be dismissed as crackpots of no importance. 5
No clearer example of this lie-fact complex can be found
than in the bizarre history of the publication titled Protocols of
the Elders of Zion. The Russian Secret Police, by changing the
cast of characters and the contents, created this defamatory for-
gery out of another, pre-existing libel of a different group, in
1903. It was later picked up and spread by the Nazis, to create
the illusion of a Judaeo-Masonic world plot. Not only did the
lie spread among the world's masses, but it was accepted by such
influential people as Houston Chamberlain and Henry Ford.7
Upon learning that the Protocols were forgeries, Ford retracted
his published opinions and withdrew the publication that he had
started because of this fabrication. But the damage that this
vicious thing had caused was beyond measure.
Calculated falsehood and vilification, systematically manip-
ulated in our pluralistic and mobile society, have in the past,
and can again become a source of political power.8
Certain groups have used libel and slander on a tre-
mendous scale to achieve their ends with varying degrees
of success. All through history unpopular individuals and
minority groups have been made the scapegoats of dema-
gogues and other seekers of power. In recent times the use
of this weapon has increased with the growth of mass com-
munication. Defamation has become an integral part of the
propaganda effort of many extremist groups.9
It is ironic, indeed, that in the United States, guardian and
protector of individual rights and champion of justice, eighteen
years after fighting a global war which was largely the result of
group hatreds and defamations, there is no law to combat these
same evils. Where are the laws for decent democratic conduct
that World War II showed to be indispensable? Can it be that
even our most astute legal minds believe prejudice and defama-
5 Forster and Epstein, The Troublemakers, 76 (Doubleday, 1956).
6 Rollin, L'Apoclypse de Notre Temps (Gallimard, Paris, 1936).
7 Loewenstein, op. cit. supra n. 4 at 59-60.
8 Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Colum-
bia L. Rev. 727, 728 (1942).
9 Comment, Group Libel, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 290, 295 (1953).
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tion to be merely local problems-a normal though dangerous
part of modern living? Were these the thoughts of the leaders
of the European communities as Mein Kampf was being sent to a
printer? Are these the thoughts of our best jurists as racists
today defame and threaten fellow Americans because they are
Negroes?
It is not an entirely hopeless picture, however. Right now
an important case is before the Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ° presents the ques-
tion whether published statements critical of the entire Mont-
gomery, Alabama, police department were defamatory as to the
unnamed police commissioner. Prior to this controversial case
an unnamed member of such a small group clearly had no
grounds for protection. Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court af-
firmed a half million dollar award for the commissioner, who
claimed that the fund-appealing newspaper advertisement was
libelous per se and defamatory to him. If the high court can
cut through to the central question, the legal anathema of unre-
strained wholesale defamation may be corrected.
For the High Court, or any court, to begin analysis of this
problem, certain terminology, long much misused, must be clari-
fied. "Group" or "class," used interchangeably, are not the same
things. Historically, real class libel, defaming an entire people,
was not actionable. However, in practice, class has been held to
mean all individuals possessing a common characteristic of resi-
dence," occupation, 12 membership on a committee or board,
13
race, or religion. Group has been held to mean such mass desig-
nations as the professional men or public officers within one cer-
tain city.14 Does this mean that all Jehovah's Witnesses living
10 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 676, 144 S. 2d 25 (1962), case
#39, Docket #606. Connected case, Abernathy v. Sullivan (Ala. Sup. Ct.)
144 S. 2d 25 (1962), case #40, Docket #609. The following have been grant-
ed the right to file amicus curiae briefs: Case #39: The Washington Post
Co., The Tribune Co., and the American Civil Liberties Union; Case #40:
The American Civil Liberties Union.
11 Cook v. Rief, 20 Jones and S. 302 (N. Y. 1885); see, 34 Columbia L. Rev.
1322 (1934).
12 Comes v. Cruce, 85 Ark. 79, 107 S. W. 185 (1908).
13 Goldsborough v. Orsem & Johnson, 103 Md. 671, 64 A. 36 (1906); Wofford
v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349, 30 S. 625 (1900); Byers v. Martin, 2 Colo. 605 (1875).
14 Levert v. Daily States Publishing Co., 123 La. 594, 49 S. 206 (1909). For
a later distinction between the terms see Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402,
409, 121 S.E. 912, 914 (1924). See also, Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 186,
(Continued on next page)
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in the town of Solon, Ohio, for example, constitute a group,
whereas all those living in Ohio form a class? Where the size of
the group approaches that of the class, the definitional incon-
sistencies become obvious. Consequently, there is no sound, all-
inclusive or controlling definition available to guide court think-
ing.15
In either type of action, the burden of going forward in-
volves proof that the matter was communicated or published by
the defendant, either intentionally or negligently, to someone
other than the person defamed.' The third party must have
understood the defamatory meaning of the published matter, 17
which if not apparent on its face is accomplished through the
inducement and innuendo.'8 These supply the allegations of fact
which are extrinsic to the defamatory statement, and make it
capable of being understood, or explain a second meaning. 19
This allegation is difficult to prove when the group size ap-
proaches that of a class. Not only must it be established that the
third party understood the libelous connotation, but it must be
clearly proved, also, that he knew that the plaintiff was a member
of the group,20 and that the statement was directed at him. 21
(Continued from preceding page)
202 (N. Y. 1840); Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Assn., 184 N. Y. 479,
485, 77 N.E. 660, 661 (1906); Fenstermaker v. Tribune Publishing Co., 12
Utah 439, 460, 43 P. 112, 114 (1895); American Civil Liberties Union Inc., v.
Kiely, 40 F. 2d 451, 453 (C. C. A. 2d 1930).
15 See People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N.E. 459 (1907).
16 Prosser, Torts, 596, et seq. (2d. ed., 1955); 1 Encyc. of Negligence, c. 18
(1962).
17 Simpson v. Steen, 127 F. Supp. 132, 137-138 (D. C. Utah 1954): "It is not
sufficient that the plaintiff knows he was the subject of the article or that
the defendant knew this when he was writing, but it must appear that third
parties must have reasonably understood that the article was written of and
concerning the plaintiff." Prosser, Id. at 579.
18 Inducement: the plaintiff must show facts creating the defamation which
facts are not apparent on the face of the statement: Kee v. Armstrong, Byrd
& Co., 75 Okl. 84, 182 P. 494, 5 A. L. R. 1349 (1919); Ten Broeck v. Journal
Printing Co., 166 Minn. 173, 207 N.W. 497 (1926).
Innuendo: where the inducement is not clear, he must connect the facts to
the defamation: Pfeifly v. Henry, 269 Pa. 533, 112 A. 768, 13 A. L. R. 1018(1921); Sharpe v. Larson, 70 Minn. 209, 72 N.W. 961 (1897): e.g., "Burns is
a member of the X-Y-Z Club." Inducement: The club was forcibly closed
by the city. Innuendo: It was understood to have been engaging in illegal
activities.
19 Henn, Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 Cornell L. Q. 14, 19 (1961).
20 Ryckman v. Delavan, supra n. 14; see generally: 33 Am. Jur., Libel &
Slander, Sec. 240.
21 Louisville Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 68 S. W. 2d 411 (1934); Prosser,
op. cit. supra n. 16, at 583.
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This crucial element, nearly impossible to prove,22 has been re-
iterated from earliest times,23 to the detriment of the plaintiff.
The courts have brought into existence, by their interpretations
of this key element, the unchecked wholesale defamation of
whole groups, or even worse, of whole classes. Finally, the plain-
tiff must prove that because of the defamation he suffered in-
jury to his reputation. 24
The difficulties faced by the group defamation victim are
obvious on paper and terrifying in reality. In merely defending
his reputation, he is confronted by unprovable issues and, as
will be pointed out, is bludgeoned in court by a history of "ration-
al-reasonable" civil and criminal precedents. A brief outline of
this paradox has been set out here, but the question still remains
whether the civil-common law or our legislatures have an answer
to this unbelievable legal quandary.
The Common Law
In its earliest beginnings suit for defamation was an action
seeking recompense for shame brought upon the plaintiff.25
22 "A publication may clearly be defamatory as to somebody, and yet on its
face make no reference to the individual plaintiff. In such a case the plain-
tiff must sustain the burden of pleading and proof, by way of 'colloquium,'
that the defamatory meaning attached to him. If he fails to do so, he has
not made out his case." Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 16, at 583. See Restate-
ment of Torts, Sec. 564, Comment c; Macaulay v. Bryan, 339 P. 2d 377 (Nev.
Sup. Ct. 1959); Mick v. American Dental Association, 49 N. J. Super. 262, 139
A. 2d 570 (1958).
Colloquium must be proved in order to preserve the complaint against
demurrer: Palmerlee v. Nottage, 119 Minn. 351, 138 N. W. 312 (1912).
23 Lord Campbell: "Where a class is described it may very well be that
the slander refers to a particular individual. That is a matter of which
evidence is to be laid before the jury, and the jurors are to determine
whether, when a class is referred to, the individual who complains that the
slander applied to him is, in point of fact, justified in making such com-
plaint. That is clearly a reasonable principle, because whether a man is
called by one name, or whether he is called by another, or whether he is
described by a pretended description of a class to which he is known to be-
long, if those who look on, know well who is aimed at, the very same injury
is inflicted, the very same thing is in fact done as would be done if his name
and christian name were ten times repeated." LeFanu v. Malcolmson, 1
H. L. C. 637, 668, 9 Eng. Rep. 910 (1848). Although this principle has been
repeated ad nauseam and should be clearly understood by now, misunder-
standing has crept into legal thinking. For example, it has been stated that
if a publication does not defame any ascertainable person, it is not libel, but
if one publishes material about a group, he assumes the risk of it being
libelous to any member thereof. Simpson v. Steen, 127 F. Supp. 132 (D. C.
Utah 1954).
24 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 16, at 574; 1 Encyc. of Negl. § 205 (1962).
25 The action was found in historical records of 13th century middle ages
courts. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 99, 100. The no-
(Continued on next page)
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This law gradually developed 26 a pervasive doctrine in 1700
which formed the legal precedent for succeeding years. Today's
libel law stems from this case of brittle age, and even more
brittle logic-King v. Alme & Nott 27-where the court said:
Where a writing inveighs against mankind in general
or against a particular order of men, as for instance men of
the gown, this is not libel, but it must descend to particulars
and individuals to make it libel.
The jurors set this defamation claim aside, not for sound legal
reasons, but because none of them knew the plaintiffs, and con-
sequently were unable to determine who had been defamed. 28
It is ironical that present legal inequities should be grounded
upon the oft-quoted summary of an erroneous decision. In an
odd twist of legal history, which has not had the pervasive in-
fluence of the above cited case, the very same court 32 years
later permitted an unnamed member of a group of Portuguese
Jews to recover for injury caused by circulated false rumors. 29
As an overall consequence of the Alme & Nott precedent,
recovery today for defamation is dependent on the sheer size of
the group. On the average, any number over twenty is too
large.30 Thus, a dozen Washington, D. C., parking lot owners
could not get compensation for defamation. 31 The court recog-
(Continued from preceding page)
tion of socially harmful libel dates back to 1275, when the English Parlia-
ment enacted De Scandalis Magnatum which was designed to suppress the
Lollard rhymes ridiculing the rulers during the peasant revolts. Kelly,
Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 Kan. L. Rev. 295, 300 (1958).
26 In a collection of Ecclesiastical Court cases ranging from 1475 to 1610, 42
out of 7C0 involved defamation. Carr, History of Defamation, 18 Law Q.
Rev. 255, 270 (1902), citing Archdeacon Hale's Precedents.
27 The King v. Alme & Nott, 3 Salkeld 224, 91 Eng. Rep. 790 (1700); also
found as Rex v. Orme & Nutt, Trin. 11 Will. 3, B. R. 1 Ld. Raym. 486, 91
Eng. Rep. 1224 (1700).
28 Note: Liability for Defamation of a Group, 34 Columbia L. Rev. 1322,
1332 (1934).
29 Rex v. Osborne, 2 Barn K. B. 166 (1732). The court opined that defama-
tory writings which instigated street riots could not go unpunished.
30 Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N. E. 2d 553
(1947); Fowler v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 303, 182 F. 2d 377 (App. D. C.
1950). Contra: 75 Jews of Quebec: Ortenberg v. Plamondon, 24 R. J. Q. 69,
385 (C. B. R. Quebec), 35 Can. L. T. 262, 267 (1914).
31 Service Parking Corp. v. Washington Times Co., 67 App. D. C. 351, 92 F.
2d 502 (1937). Contra: Groups between 8 and 12 in size have recovered:
Gross v. Cantor, 270 N. Y. 93, 200 N. E. 592 (1936); Weston v. Commercial
Advertiser Ass'n., 184 N. Y. 479, 77 N. E. 660 (1906); Bornmann v. Star Co.,
174 N. Y. 212, 66 N. E. 723 (1903).
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nized this numerical block in Marr v. Putnam32 when it con-
cluded that each member loses his right of protection against
language directed at them when the group takes on significant
size. A group as small as a state board of supervisors3 3 was de-
fenseless against damning derogatory statements about alleged
state fund mismanagement, because of this outstanding principle.
Conversely, and as an example of its inexact application, an un-
named member of a Texas posse recovered for application to his
group of the designation of an "army of savages." 34 A court even
denied recovery in a perjury accusation where the charge was
directed against only three of seven unnamed witnesses. 35 Not
even the limiting phrase "some of," applied to a group, receives
uniform treatment in our law.36
The law has not afforded relief to groups of persons bound
by race or religion, on the principle that they are not recog-
nizable units having legal powers to sue. They are formless and
shifting segments of the population, incapable of defending
themselves. Without group economic interests apart from those
of its constituent members, such groups are viewed by such
laws as having suffered no cognizable loss of public confidence.3 7
These concepts, best described as "recognizable interest," illus-
trate the legal attempts to create principles which satisfy the
logical conscience. Yet, how can anyone really believe that at-
tacks upon "The Negroes" do not undermine the aggregate pub-
lic confidence?
A clearly defined economic-property interest rationale de-
veloped in the early part of this century and, because of it, the
courts refused to listen to defamation suits brought by non-
32 196 Ore. 1, 246 P. 2d 509 (1952).
33 Noral v. Hearst Publications, 40 Cal. App. 2d 348, 104 P. 2d 860, 863(1940). In a case involving merely Detroit trading stamp concerns, not a
large group, recovery was denied: Watson v. Detroit Journal Co., 143 Mich.
430, 107 N. W. 81 (1906).
34 Chapa v. Abernathy, 175 S. W. 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
35 Kenworthy v. Journal Co., 117 Mo. App. 327, 93 S. W. 882 (1906).
36 Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 277 N. W. 177 (1938); Zanker v.
Lackey, 32 Del. 588, 128 A. 373 (1925); Blaser v. Krattinger, 99 Ore. 392, 195
P. 359 (1921). Contra: Hardy v. Williamson, 86 Ga. 551, 12 S. E. 874 (1891).
37 Lewis, Individual Member's Right to Recover for a Defamation Leveled
at a Group, 17 U. Miami L. Rev. 519 (1963); Comment, Class Defamation-
Scurrilous Matters in Mails, 6 Villa. L. Rev. 525 (1961). See also: Belton,
The Control of Group Defamation: A Comparative Study of Law and its
Limitations, 34 Tulane L. Rev. 469, 470, 480 (1960); Whittenberg, Individual
Recovery for Defamation of a Group, 15 Ohio St. L. J. 273 (1954); Note,
Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 898 (1956).
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profit associations 3s or unions. Although following World War
I the courts did begin to see a collective economic interest in
the possible decrease in dues-paying union membership con-
fronted by defamatory remarks, 39 this theory has deteriorated
and has been replaced by thoughts of the loss of community
prestige to both the union and its membership.40 Does this new
thought presage the dawn of an "enlightened equitable era"?
Will it apply to groups in which no common economic interest
exists?
Inconsistent theories and outmoded concepts plague the in-
jured plaintiff, yet none is more outrageous than the legal laby-
rinth created out of the "ascertainable person" element. 4 1 The
libeler or hatemonger does not hurt merely one person, but a mul-
titude of people. He usually intends to do this, and then evade
liability, with court sanction, on the grounds that he did not mean
that "all Catholics support a foreign power" but only "some of"
them. But recovery in the "some of" cases also is denied. The
total legal effect is one of utter unreasonableness of law.
Our jurists view such a statement as "all Catholics owe
their allegiance to a foreign power" as unobjectionable, on the
additional rationale that "reasonable" readers will know that it
does not mean "all," and that they would not take it literally.
42
This means that if the reader himself does not directly apply the
statement to the victim, 43 the defamation remains legally harm-
38 Stone v. Textile Examiners & Shrinkers Employer's Ass'n., 137 App. Div.
655, 122 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1910).
39 Finnish Temperance Society v. Finnish Socialistic Publishing Co., 238
Mass. 345, 130 N. E. 845 (1921); New York Society for Suppression of Vice
v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 129 Misc. 408, 221 N. Y. Supp. 563 (Sup. Ct.
1927). Contra: A. D. A. v. Meade, 72 Pa. D. & C. 306 (Com. P1. 1950), where
a Pennsylvania chapter of A. D. A. had to allege a pecuniary loss when ac-
cused falsely of being communist infiltrated.
40 "If the business and credit of the Union be destroyed, as well as it might
be by defamatory statements which falsely charged corrupt and dishonest
acts by the Union, each of its 17,000 members is affected equally by the pos-
sible loss of position and the loss of protection and benefits furnished by the
Union." (Italics added.) Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., 261 App.
Div. 181, 24 N. Y. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (1941); aff'd. 287 N. Y. 373, 39 N. E. 2d
919 (1942).
41 Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 121 S. E. 912 (1924).
42 Salmond, Torts, 405 (9th ed. 1936).
43 Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc., 137 N. E. 2d 1 (N. Y. App.
1956). The fallacy in this reasoning was pointed out by Judge Field's dis-
sent at page 16:
"As reason and decision make plain, a publisher may not brand his
(Continued on next page)
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less. Moreover, our judges attribute other idealistic and benev-
olent attributes to our hypothetical reader, such as:
The most effective restraint upon the abuse of that free-
dom (of discussion and criticism in religious and public
affairs) is in the good taste of the participants, or, if that
fail, as it often does, in the knowledge that defamatory and
abusive attacks are self-defeating." (Italics added.) 44
Going beyond the "reasonable man" test, the courts have
viewed our hypothetical statement as opinion or comment45-
merely another innocuous contribution in the marketplace of
ideas! A recent case of otherwise actionable libel of a labor union
by a newspaper publisher was dismissed because
It is better for the public welfare that some occasional
injury to an individual arising from a general censure . . .
if his group go without remedy than that free public dis-
cussion of questions of public interest be checked.40
It is clear that our common law of defamation has unfail-
ingly followed a "sticks-and-stones" philosophy, and almost uni--
formly has thwarted honest attempts to silence the evil speaker.
This dilemma was pointed out by Justice Jackson in Kunz v.
New York: 4
7
Jews, many of whose families perished in the extermi-
nation furnaces of Dachau or Auschwitz, are more than
tolerant if they pass off lightly the suggestion that unbe-
lievers in Christ should all have burned. Of course, people
might pass this speaker by as a mental case, and so, they
might file out of a theater in good order at the cry of fire.
But in both cases there is a genuine likelihood that some-
one will get hurt.V1
As for the philosophy in particular:
We can at least eliminate as over optimistic the belief
that statements which defame large groups are mere idle
(Continued from preceding page)
victim with suspicion and then avoid liability by attempting to foist
upon the reader the burden and responsibility of ascertaining whether
or not there is anything to the charge. . . Where the general tenor of
the publication is such that it may be fairly read as casting a high de-
gree of suspicion on every one of the persons listed, the mere suggestion
that some of those named may not fall within the objectionable category
cannot suffice, per se, to shield the defendant from liability."
44 People v. Edmonson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y. Supp. 2d 257 (1938).
45 Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (8th Cir. 1894).
46 Noral v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 2d 348, 104 P. 2d 880
(1940).
47 The case involved a public speaker denouncing Jews as "Christ-killers
who Hitler should have finished off." 340 U. S. 290, 95 L. Ed. 280, 71 Sup.
Ct. 312 (1951).
48 Id. at 330.
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blathering and do no harm to the individuals. This belief is
the adult variant of the child's "Sticks and stones can break
my bones, but names can never hurt me"-a song never
sung by any child who is not smarting under the hurt.49
Criminal Law-Federal Legislation
To say that Capitol Hill is insensitive to the pressures of dis-
crimination and defamation would be a naive misunderstanding
of political reality. In spite of this, Congressional attempts to
curb the evils of group defamation nurtured by our common law,
present a picture of utter futility. Fruitlessly, bills to curb hate
literature through group libel legislation have been introduced
into every Congress since 1947, and before that in 1943.50 Thirty-
one attempts were made, and a few did get out of committee.
The rest died there. Of those which reached a vote, the only
ones to become law have made it an offense to intentionally put
libelous, scurrilous, or defamatory matter on an envelope, an
outside mail cover, or a post card,51 or to mail indecent articles
49 Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Colum-
bia L. Rev. 727, 771 (1942).
50 1943, 78th Congress: Dickstein Resolution, H. J. Res. 49 (To declare
certain papers, pamphlets, books, pictures, and writings nonmailable), re-
ceived no action; H.R. 2328, received no action.
1947, 80th Congress: H.R. 2848 (To suppress the evil of anti-semitism
and the hatred of any race because of race, creed, or color), received no
action.
1949, 81st Congress: H.R. 2269 (To make unlawful the transportation or
importation of false and defamatory statements designed to arouse inter-
group conflict); H.R. 2270-73.
1952, 82nd Congress: H.R. 7717-19; H.R. 7723; H.R. 8033.
1953, 83rd Congress: H.R. 168; H.R. 3154; H.R. 10286.
1955, 84th Congress; H.R. 683; H.R. 5418; H.R. 7427; H.R. 10294; S. 446.
1957, 85th Congress: H.R. 883; H.R. 3662.
1959, 86th Congress: H.R. 1154; H.R. 1934; H.R. 3127.
1961, 87th Congress: H.R. 521; H.R. 610; H.R. 1034.
1963, 88th Congress: H.R. 535; H.R. 1104.
Source: Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress; Proposed
Federal Group Libel Legislation, House Judiciary Staff Report, 15-18 (Feb.
1963). Terminology of current proposal.
H.R. 535 indicates its scope. It is limited to amending title 18 of the
criminal code declaring certain papers, etc., nonmailable.
"That . . . all papers, pamphlets, magazines, periodicals, books, pic-
tures, and writings of any kind, containing any defamatory and false
statements which tend to expose persons designated, identified, or char-
acterized therein by race or religion, any of whom reside in the United
States, to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy or tend to cause such
persons to be shunned or avoided or to be injured in their business or
occupation are hereby declared nonmailable matter, and shall not be
conveyed in the mails, or delivered from any post office ... and shall be
withdrawn...."
For a review of futile legislative attempts see Tanenhaus, Group
Libel, 35 Cornell L. Q. 261 (1950).
51 62 Stat. 782 (1948); 18 U. S. C. § 1718 (1958).
Jan., 1964
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss1/5
GROUP DEFAMATION (U. S. A.)
which tend to incite arson, murder, or assassination. 52 These
may have been political expedients, as they come nowhere near
scratching the surface of the main problem, and appear to be
battles against straw men.
Congress, in the past several sessions, has been unable to
act quickly even on matters of immediate national urgency. It
unhappily must be assumed that group defamation bills will re-
main bogged down in committee. The hope that the obviousness
of the evil might evoke federal regulation has been further weak-
ened by the effects of two advisory committee reports.5 3 It was
in the President's Committee on Civil Rights that this equitable
gem was put forward:
We have considered and rejected proposals which have
been made to us for censoring or prohibiting material which
defames religious or racial minority groups. Our purpose is
not to constrict anyone's freedom to speak; it is rather to en-
able the people to better judge the true motives of those
who try to sway them .... 54
It would be fair to conclude from this that, at the national level,
an individual's rights, and their equal protection under law, must
bow to wholesale libel clothed in the glorious vestments of open
discussion!
State Legislation
Some states have attempted to adopt some form of group
libel law. Generally these have sought to control defamation of
specific groups.55 Such enactments have been tested by the
courts, but in a 15 year period, starting in 1915, there were five
major cases56 which indicated no clear trend. In the Alum-
52 62 Stat. 768 (1948); 18 U. S. C. § 1461 (1958).
53 The President's Committee on Civil Rights, "To secure these rights," 57
(1947); Commission on the Freedom of the Press, 1 Chafee, Government
and Mass Communication, 129 (1947).
54 President's Committee, id. at 52.
55 Indiana Stat. § 10-904-14 (Burns 1933), anti-racketeering aimed at Ku
Klux Klan; New Mexico Stat. Ann. ss 41-2725-7 (1941), limited to attacks
on religious and fraternal orders; W. Va. Code Ann. ss 6109 (1949), restrict-
ed to libelous pictures and theater performances; Conn. Rev. Stat. c. 417 ss
8376 (1949), applies only to group libel in advertisements; Nevada Comp.
Laws ss 10110 (Hillyer 1929), broad and weak definition; Mass. Gen. Laws
c. 272 ss 98 c (Supp. 1950); Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38 ss. 471 (1951); N. J. Rev.
Stat. Title 2 ss 157 B (1937).
56 People v. Turner, 28 Cal. App. 766, 154 P. 34 (1915); Crane v. State, 14
Okla. Crim. 30, 166 P. 1110, 19 A. L. R. 1455 (1917); People v. Gordon, 63
Cal. App. 627, 219 P. 486 (1923); People v. Speilman, 318 Ill. 482, 489, 149
(Continued on next page)
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baugh5 7 decision, libel involving the purported oath of the
Knights of Columbus, entitled "To Murder Protestants and De-
stroy American Government," was prosecuted successfully under
the Georgia Penal Code.58 Recovery by the plaintiff, a member
of a group the size of a metropolitan religious fraternal order, is
indeed extraordinary. Yet, membership in such a group is not
nearly as clear to the public consciousness as membership in a
group based upon skin color. If this defamation is deemed likely
to stir up sufficient hatred, contempt and ridicule among those
who know of the plaintiff's membership, to make necessary
criminal prosecution, then defamation of a Negro, whose link
with a group does not depend on special knowledge, certainly
should be actionable.
State statutes generally have not weathered the legal on-
slaught. The courts find excuses for denying recovery in such
questions as what is substantial danger to community welfare, 59
and in constitutional guarantees. 0 It seems that, regardless of
the degree of awareness in our legislatures, our jurists are afraid
to face and solve the group defamation problem.6 1 This is well
(Continued from preceding page)
N. E. 466 (1925); Alumbaugh v. State, 39 Ga. App. 559, 147 S.E. 714 (1929).
The Speilman case dealt with a charge by a German language newspaper
that 85% of the crime in St. Louis was caused by war veterans, and that
membership in the American Legion consisted of "refuse, tramps, vagabonds
and bums, as well as criminals." In upholding conviction for libel, the
court said, "A libel upon a class or group has as great a tendency to pro-
voke a breach of the peace or to disturb society as has a libel on an indi-
vidual, and such libel is punishable even though its application to individual
members of a class or group cannot be proved."
57 Id.
58 Ga. Penal Code 1910 sec 340 (Now title 26 sec 2101, Gen. Code of 1933).
59 Tanenhaus, op. cit. supra n. 50, at 278.
60 State v. Klapprott, 127 N. J. L. 395, 22 A. 2d 877, 880 (1941) wherein the
statute against public utterance of hatred, abuse, or violence against any
racial or religious group was declared too vague and general to avoid fatal
collision with constitutional guarantees. If left to a jury, the decision on
such a matter would be too difficult:
These are abstractions. Is it possible to say when ill-will becomes
hatred or when unworthy, scurrilous or false statements become abuse?
As well try to point to a spot within a triangle which is equidistant
from every point in the area enclosed as say when hatred takes the
place of some lesser emotion. . . We do not think such phases of human
reaction or emotion can be made a legitimate standard for a Penal
Code.
61 One reason for their failure to come to grips with the problem is that
where a defamation is issued about a large group the court is faced with
not only the statement made, but also the motive behind it. To resolve such
(Continued on next page)
Jan., 1964
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss1/5
GROUP DEFAMATION (U. S. A.)
illustrated by one libel action that involved a named auto body
shop.62 The court there could not comprehend that libel of the
business was, in effect, a defamation of the owner-operator.
The only important decision to uphold a broad defamation
statute was the famous Beauharnais case. 3 In it the United
States Supreme Court promulgated a sweeping defense of in-
dividual rights by recognizing a clear case of class defamation.
For the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said
Long ago this court recognized that the economic rights
of an individual may depend for the effectiveness of their en-
forcement on rights in the group, even though not formally
corporate, to which he belongs . . . It is not within our com-
petence to confirm or deny claims of social scientists as to
dependence of the individual on the position of his racial or
religious group in the community. It would, however, be
arrogant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of our authority
in passing on the powers of a State, for us to deny that the
Illinois Legislature may warrantably believe that a man's
job and his educational opportunities and the dignity ac-
corded to him may depend as much on the reputation of
the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly be-
longs, as on his own merits. This being so, we are pre-
cluded from saying that speech concededly punishable when
immediately directed at individuals cannot be outlawed if
directed at groups with whose position and esteem in society
the afflicted individual may be inextricably involved.64
The hope that this long awaited legal ruling stirred in the
hearts of defamation victims was vain. The decision has pro-
duced no new similar legislation, 5 nor has it produced increased
litigation.6 6 In total effect, Beauharnais exists in a vacuum. The
(Continued from preceding page)
litigation the court is immediately faced with extreme subtleties of meaning
and interpretation. It also must distinguish undesirable invective from
socially valuable comments. Comment: Group Libel, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 290,
296, 298 (1953).
62 Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 171 Tex. 284, 339 S.W. 2d 890 (1960).
Contra: Young v. New Mexico Broadcasting Co., 60 N.M. 475, 292 P. 2d 776
(1956).
63 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 96 L. Ed. 919, 72 S. Ct. 725 (1952).
The way was prepared for this decision by an earlier decision regarding the
same statute: Bevins v. Prindable, Sheriff (D. C. E. D. Ill.) 39 F. Supp.
708 (1941) affd. 314 U. S. 573 (1941), which involved the conviction of 30
Jehovah's Witnesses for distributing material defamatory to the Roman
Catholic Church.
64 Beauharnais, id., at 930.
65 Belton, The Control of Group Defamation, op. cit. supra n. 37, at 309.
66 Note: Developments in the Law of Defamation, op. cit. supra n. 37, at 901.
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only exception arose this year. State of Louisiana v. Garrison,6 7
involved the criminal prosecution of a district attorney for use
of the term "racketeer influences" in speaking of eight unnamed
criminal district judges. The Court held that the term imputed
fraud, deceit, or trickery, thereby constituting a personal attack
upon their integrity and honesty, and exposed them to hate, con-
tempt, and ridicule. This conviction may be a step forward from
Beauharnais. However, the limited number of people involved
(eight) raises grave doubt about any real progress. In addition,
the Court by-passed any consideration of the element of ascer-
tainability.
The "clear and present danger" doctrine, 68 permitting state
preservation of public order, seemed to be well adapted to defa-
mation law. Yet, the Supreme Court admitted that the doc-
trine defied decisive application, and quite possibly would be
applicable only in clear cases of war or imminent invasion.69
Even when faced by a Chicago riot initiated by a racist follower
of Gerald L. K. Smith, in which bricks smashed through audi-
torium windows and blood was shed in the street, the Court still
could find no "clear and present danger" sufficient to justify
touching the right of "free speech." 70 As a direct consequence
of this finding, our cities are unable to protect themselves from
virtually certain violence threatened by speeches of George
Lincoln Rockwell of the American Nazi Party.7'1
This view of state legislative efforts to curb group defama-
tion is disheartening. Each new attempt has been met with
another reason why nothing can be done. For example, it was
said that the very lawsuit itself might prove damaging to the in-
jured group.
. . . the publicity that would be given to the prosecution of
such a suit might very readily serve to enkindle latent
67 244 La. 787, 154 S. 2d 400 (1963).
68 Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 63 L. Ed. 470, 39 S. Ct. 249 (1919).
69 Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U. S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940).
70 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 93 L. Ed. 1131, 69 S. Ct. 894 (1948).
For a discussion of the retirement of the doctrine see: Corwin, Bowing Out:
Clear and Present Danger, 27 Notre Dame Lawyer 325 (1952).
71 "A community need not wait to be subverted by street riots and storm-
troopers; but, also, it cannot, by its policemen or commissioners, suppress a
speaker, in prior restraint, on the basis of news reports, hysteria, or
inference that what he did yesterday he will do today." Rockwell v. Morris,
12 A. D. 2d 272, 211 N. Y. Supp. 2d 25, 35 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Compare Rockwell
v. D. C., 172 A. 2d 549 (D. C. 1961).
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prejudices against the defamed group and in behalf of the
defendant, and a series of suits prosecuted by the same
class might easily lead to increased hostility against that
class, since public opinion might rebel against singling out
that class for protection. Furthermore, the mere possibility
of an acquittal will serve as a deterrent to a group libel
suit since an acquittal would appear to many to be an of-
ficial vindication of the defendant's conduct. And even a
conviction, if as infrequent as in the past might evoke pub-
lic sympathy rather than contempt, so that hatemongers
would become martyrs and their causes would become en-
hanced. Thus, a few cases of unwise convictions, a few
martyrs, a few exaggerated headlines could more than can-
cel out the good intention of the law.
72
The implication is that the solution is to bury our heads in the
sand.
The courts also have said that the importance of free speech
outweighs any sort of reasonable restraint.7 3 Yet, the First
Amendment was never intended to grant immunity to every pos-
sible use of language.74 This restricted concept has been the
basis for banning obscenity because it might "encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests." 75 If obscenity en-
croaches upon important interests, then certainly group defama-
tion encroaches upon them too, with even more corrupting ef-
fects. Certainly at least one restraint should be read in this
Amendment: The freedom should be tested at least in terms of
conceivable social utility.76
But the clear and present danger doctrine, as has been
often pointed out,77 not only provides no definite guide for
judicial conduct, but is also exceedingly naive and archaic
in its conception of the processes of opinion formation. It
assumes amounts of rationality and orderliness in discussion
which simply do not exist in the modern world-if indeed
they ever did. Also, it completely ignores the rise of mass
communication media, which give to vilifiers weapons never
72 Comment: Class Defamation-Scurrilous Matter in the Mail, 6 Villa. L.
Rev. 525, 530 (1961).
73 Note, Group Libel and Criminal Libel, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 258, 262 (1952).
74 Frohwerk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 204, 206, 63 L. Ed. 561, 39 S. Ct. 249 (1919);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 62 S. Ct. 766
(1942), involving profane, libelous, and insulting words which by their very
utterance inflict injury.
75 Roth v. U. S., 354 U. S. 476, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 77 S. Ct. 1304 (1957).
76 Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 423, 453 (1952).
77 Latham, The Theory of the Judicial Concept of Freedom of Speech, 52 J,
of Pol. 637 (1950).
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before possessed with which to carry on large scale, or-
ganized campaigns of defamation. It ignores the present
urbanization of American society, which raises problems of
the maintenances of public order and also produces a close
contact between the social groups, which did not exist on
such a scale in an agrarian society. Finally, it ignores the
fact that in an industrial society, systematic vilification of
social groups is one of the elements which leads to various
economic discriminations which are a too prevalent feature
of American life.7s
Very early in the history of the common law, reputation was
singled out as an important individual right.
The security of his reputation or good name from the
arts of detraction and slander are rights to which every man
is entitled, by reason and natural justice; since without these,
it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other
advantage or right.79
This vested interest in reputation and a fair name is the legal
basis of the action for defamation. s As such, it dictated the di-
rection of both the criminal and common law that have led to
today's quandary.,
Personal humiliation from group slander is not uncom-
mon. When a race, business, profession or nation is publicly
slandered and when a member of the slandered group is
present and known to others present to be a representative
of the group, person humiliation is inevitable. It is not
actionable, however s 2 (Italics added.)
The law must overhaul its dusty concepts of individual rights
and bring them abreast of social and scientific progress. Reputa-
78 Beth, Group Libel and Free Speech, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 167, 174 (1955).
79 Blackstone, Commentaries, 134 (Cooley, Am. Ed.). Reputation and good
name appear in Wyckliffe's De Civili Dominio, and although highly idealistic
in concept, it is a tacit recognition of its importance per se: "It is untrue
then that men, when they speak falsely, blacken the fame of a consistently
good man, for the fame is written in the book of life, and the good man is
a 'mirror unspotted'."
80 Harper, Torts, § 235 (1933); Black's Law Dictionary, 505 (4th ed. 1951).
81 Our criminal defamation law is the product of twin concepts. The initial
criminal concept was to permit recovery for injury to the reputation of the
individual: State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34, 31 Am. Dec. 217 (1837); whereas
the Common Law placed its primary emphasis upon the libel's tendency to
provoke breaches of the peace: King v. Griffin, Sess. Cas. 74, 93 Eng. Rep. 75
(1732); King v. Summers and Summers, 1 Lev. 139, 83 Eng. Rep. 337 (1664);
State v. Haskins, 109 Ia. 656, 80 N. W. 1062 (1899); Commonwealth v.
Syliakys, 254 Mass. 424, 150 N. E. 190 (1926); State v. Pierce, 140 Ore. 1, 12
P. 2d 320 (1932).
The emphasis of one concept over the other can be seen in many state
enactments which today provide for prosecution for offenses against the
person (e.g., Calif., Okla., Ga.); Tanenhaus, op. cit. supra n. 50 at 273.
82 Macauley v. Bryan, 75 Nev. 278, 282, 339 P. 2d 377, 378-9 (1959).
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tion involves the reactions of others to the comments of still
others.8 3 Contemporary concepts of the nature of a man's reputa-
tion are available and should be adopted by the courts.
A person's standing in the community with his friends,
neighbors-and prospective acquaintances-is of great value
and he is entitled to have his relations with them unim-
paired by defamatory harms. The regard of those around
him more completely conditions his behavior than any other
one factor, and it likewise adds more to his stature as a per-
son than any other one factor. This interest has long been
identified and valued as reputation, or less accurately, as
character. It is an incident of group life and is found in all
other group relations as in trade, family, profession, and
political groups. It takes on the color of the particular group
and is given different degrees of protection accordingly. The
doctrines of slander and libel have in large part been de-
veloped about the protection of community relations.8 4
The courts must realize that repeated lies by a defamer instill
an unhealthy doubt about the reputation of those defamed, in the
minds of their acquaintances, present or future.8 5 It is indica-
tive of a community's cultural, social and political quality to
observe how an individual values his reputation, its place in the
community scheme of values, and most particularly, the type of
protective measures provided for it.86
Measured by this standard, American society is little better
than barbaric.8 7
The Price of Our Legal Insanity
Can anyone ever forget the fantastically swift spread in
popularity of the "hula-hoop" or rock-n-roll? The significance of
these short-term national manias should not be overlooked.
The study of these contagious practices is of psycho-
logic importance because our technical means of communi-
83 Probert, Defamation, A Camouflage of Psychic Interests, etc., 15 Vand. L.
Rev. 1173, 1176-77 (1962).
Psychologically, "... 'he' does not end at his skin; 'he' is not to be most
fully understood by talking about him as you see him. What 'he' is involves
a product, so to speak, of him and others. 'He' is a function of his group
identities and interrelations, as well as his internal make-up." Id. at 1179.
84 Green, Malone, Pedrick and Rahl, Injuries to Relations, 332 (1959).
85 Maslow, Group Libel Reconsidered, Congress Weekly (Jan. 23, 1948).
86 "In making an appraisal of any society it is pertinent to ask what in-
dividuals are protected against what kinds of statements and by what legal
mechanisms." Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 99 (1949).
87 Cultural lag-the malady; persistence of the remnants of feudal ideologies
in the face of modern economic and technological progress-the causation.
Loewenstein, Christians and Jews, 88 (Internatl. Univ. Press 1951).
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cation-press, radio, and T.V.-have now increased their ef-
fect to the point where nearly everybody is within reach
of an infectious source. The mind of man is never isolated
anymore. His feelings, thinking, and creating are bound
to mankind by a million ties of mutual influence. s8
More gruesome examples of such mental contagion are the re-
cent rash of painted swastikas on synagogues, churches, and
public buildings, public speeches defaming Negroes as a race, the
pre-World War II spread of anti-semitism. 9 Such phenomena
or anti-something mania are linked with group defamation, while
group defamation and discrimination are inextricably connected
with a bigger problem, prejudice,90 which has been recognized
as a mental infection and social mental disease.91 It is a problem
of our times for which everyone has a theory, but no one an
answer.
Racial prejudice is a powerful disruptive social force
breeding violence and harming every community it touches;
and its influence is becoming increasingly apparent in many
parts of the world. There is every need therefore to under-
stand its origins, to prevent its spread, and to control its
manifestation.2
88 Meerloo, Mental Infection and the Swastika, 2 Amer. Practitioner 59A
(April, 1960).
89 Loewenstein, op. cit. supra n. 87 at 44. In the middle ages dance epi-
demics spread throughout Europe following the Plague and Black Death.
Such manias have been attributed to some latent mental anxiety which in-
cites human beings to look for a new emotional expression and exaltation.
Meerloo, op. cit. supra n. 88.
90 Maslow, The Law and Race Relations, 244 The Annals 75, 80 (Mar. 1946);
Blake-Palmer, Group Prejudice, 2 Med. J. of Australia 813, 814 (Dec. 1,
1956): Prejudice is the mental state corresponding to the practice of dis-
crimination; Bird, a consideration of the Etiology of Prejudice, 5 J. Amer.
Psychoanalytic Ass'n., 490, 506 (1957). See generally, Simpson & Yinger,
Racial & Cultural Minorities, etc. (1953); Riesman, Democracy and Defama-
tion: Fair Game and Fair Comment I and II, 42 Columbia L. Rev. 1085, 1282
(1942).
91 Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, et al., The Authoritarian Personality, 7
(1950); Loewenstein, op. cit. supra n. 87 at 19.
92 Comment: Racial Prejudice, 1 Lancet (London) 81 (Jan. 10, 1953), in
which the need for more research is pointed out.
"The need for an understanding of the dynamics of prejudice has no
equivalent in importance in the social sciences. In no other aspects of inter-
personal and intergroup relationships is there a more urgent need for social
sciences to 'get out and do something.'
"Prejudice is not a new subject. Yet, we are ill adapted to cope with the
problems of prejudice which have grown increasingly acute in the social
evolutions of recent years." Lippitt & Radke, New Trends in the Investiga-
tion of Prejudice, The Annals, op. cit. supra n. 90 at 167.
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Manipulation of prejudice in order to obtain power, of
course, also is to be expected.
Mental infection through rumors and defiling habits can
be used as an instrument of political aggression and seduc-
tion. It can be used to instill fear, to exhaust the thinking of
a population that has lost its mental bearings.
93
In America, today, hot houses of prejudice are being built daily,
deliberately to instigate group tensions:
. . . the way is always open to the clever manipulator
to exploit the ready made block of votes which such a situa-
tion opportunely favors. There is thus a vested interest in
preserving the life of differences which divide sections of
the community into more easily managed groups.04
The skeptic will scoff at the suggestion of this latent power,
but he cannot deny that in this country group defamation flour-
ishes, and as such, furthers anti-democratic ideas 5 by attacks
upon defenseless minority groups.
Where a large number of people suffer from various forms of
social mental diseases, whether victims or hatemongers, our com-
munities' whole health and effectiveness is impaired. 90 In a
study 7 of the American Negro, it was found that prejudices in the
forms of discrimination and class distinctions created intra-psychic
accommodations. Much of this marginal adaptation eventually
harmed the community by precipitating derangements in family
structure, in the individual's development potential, and in group
cohesion. Each of these is a real loss, measurable in part by
economic progress (or lack thereof) and by per capita income.
Another measure is the crime rate, which in no small part is in-
fluenced by an individual's self-assessment of his place in a hos-
tile society.98
93 Meerloo, op. cit. supra n. 88 at 60A. "Political movements can make use of
the simple knowledge of the rules of mental infection to merge masses and
audiences together and to make them do what the magician-dictator wants
them to do." Id.
94 Blake-Palmer, op. cit. supra n. 90 at 816.
95 Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 Minn. L.
Rev. 609 (1949).
96 Kardiner & Ovesey, The Mark of Oppression 370 (1951) (harm to the
victim); Loewenstein, op. cit. supra n. 87 at 18: "Efficiency is known to be
impaired in people who are mentally sick. This is also true of the social
mental diseases. People in the pathological group of anti-Semites are pre-
vented by their obsession from seeking rational and permanent solutions to
their social and economic problems."
97 Kardiner & Ovesey, id. at 386. (Ed: there is a great need for similar
studies into the effects of prejudice upon other victimized groups.)
98 Id. at 304.
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Certainly, a few rational men in legal history have recog-
nized the evil and danger inherent in vicious attacks upon group
reputation. But it has been only within the last forty years that
the social sciences have disclosed the shocking scope of human
injury inflicted by all forms of prejudice.98 a These studies will
be reviewed, keeping in mind the interrelation of defamation-
discrimination and prejudice. The latter, a form of mental sick-
ness, is nurtured by the former, whether viewed by the victim
or the aggressor.
The outstanding current studies usually have involved Negro
or Jewish minorities. They have established that prejudice and
segregation force middle-class Negroes to realize that even the
able and ambitious are prevented from achieving any real degree
of the success of which they are individually capable and deserv-
ing.99 They build up feelings of bitter resentment, and must face
continuing frustration in job discrimination. 00 It is even worse
for lower-class Negroes, who face the actual inability to make a
living.' 0 '
... No private virtue can compensate anyone to the extent
of being able to counteract the impediments of self-realiza-
tion. The Negro, being a member of our society, cannot in-
vent new objectives for personal endeavor. The only objec-
tive we can think of that would not run afoul of the white
man's discrimination would be Yogism. This type of adapta-
tion happens not to be in vogue anywhere in Western Soci-
ety;
... Being a member of a despised group would, by itself, be
damaging to self-esteem, as it is with Jews, or any minority
group. The greatest damage, however, is done by the im-
pediments to opportunity. 10 2
Faced with constant frustrations to achievement, the Negro
builds up anxiety, rage and hate, which he must prevent from
98a Bogardus, Immigration & Race Attitudes (Heath, 1928); Freud, Civiliza-
tion and its Discontents (London: Hogarth 1930): the manifestation of an-
tagonism toward minority groups-the scapegoat theory of prejudice; Ich-
heiser, Fear of Violence, etc., of Sociometry 376 (1944); Frenkel-Brunswik
& Sanford, Some Personality Factors in Anti-Semitism, 20 J. Psychol. 271
(1945); Alport & Kramer, Some Roots of Prejudice, 22 J. Psychol. 9-39
(1946).
99 Thompson, The Formation of Social Attitudes, 32 Amer. J. Orthopsychi-
atry 74, 76 (Jan. 1962).
100 Adams, Segregation-Integration: Patterns of Culture and Social adjust-
ments, 28 Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry 14, 18 (1958).
101 Ibid.
102 Kardiner & Ovesey, op. cit. supra n. 96 at 369.
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initiating physical motor expression, 10 3 i.e., violent outbursts. 0 4
This forces him into defensive psychological adjustments which
are unnatural, and into damaging mental postures, such as self-
hatred and depression. 0 5 Some retreat into submissiveness and
compliance, adopting the "Uncle Tom" attitude, 0 6 the role of one
who retreats before a white and expresses humble gratitude for
discarded clothing.
The effect of all these security operations is insidious
and terribly damaging not only to the self-esteem but to the
spontaniety, freedom of expression and creativity of the Ne-
gro. His productivity and generativity are usually seriously
damaged, and by middle age despair has given way to resig-
nation and apathy. Much of his life is role stereotyped, ritu-
alistic, and minimally expressive of genuine feelings.
0 7
The Negro child in our discriminatory-defamatory society
has been found to build up anxieties when his parents reflect the
tensions of race relations. 0 8 He is soon burdened with an "in-
escapable inferiority feeling, a fixed ceiling to his aspiration level
... and a sense of humiliation and resentment which can entail
patterns of hatred against himself and his own group, as well as
against the dominant white group." 109
The result of the continuous frustrations in childhood
is to create a personality devoid of confidence in human re-
lations, of an eternal vigilance and distrust of others. This
is a purely defensive maneuver which purports to protect
the individual against the repeatedly traumatic effects of
disappointment and frustration. He must operate on the
assumption that the world is hostile." 0
All of these deep-seated, long-lasting injuries, inflicted by
our society's failure to extend any group protection to rights of
103 Id. at 304.
104 Lief, An Atypical Stereotype of the Negroes' Social Worlds, 32 Amer. J.
Orthopsychiatry 86, 87 (Jan. 1962).
105 Kardiner & Ovesey, op. cit. supra n. 96 at 304-5: Low self-esteem has
several forms of compensation within the victim (1) Apathy, (2) Hedonism,
(3) Living for the moment, (4) Criminality.
106 Lief, op. cit. supra n. 104.
107 Lief, op. cit. supra n. 104 at 88.
108 Adams, op. cit. supra n. 100 at 14.
109 Bernard, School Desegregation-Some Psychiatric Implications, 21 Psy-
chiatry 149, 151 (1958); it is Doctor Bernard's conclusion that racial preju-
dice has very bad consequential effects upon mental health. (Ed.: the
contribution of wholesale group defamation cannot be denied.)
110 Kardiner & Ovesey, op. cit. supra n. 96 at 308.
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reputation and name, are self-perpetuated, i.e., vicious circles."'
As such, they are traumatic occurrences which produce symp-
toms of mental illness. Negro tensions of repressed aggression
have produced migrainous headaches and hypertension. 112 Other
observed forms of mental illness have been psychoneurotic or
psychopathic behavior and psychosomatic disease."' In the Jew-
ish group, there is a comparatively high incidence of anxiety
neuroses, schizophrenia, and manic-depression, attributed to fre-
quent exposure to psychologically traumatic prejudicial expe-
riences.1 4
If there were more studies into effects upon victims, the
variety of substantial injuries would certainly be greater. It has
been known for some time that psychic stimuli cause traumatic
neuroses, miscarriage, and transient sickness. 1 5 A psychological
trauma can provoke or aggravate bronchial asthma, DeCosta's
syndrome, 11 angina pectoris, hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis,
peptic ulcer, gastritis, 1 7 diabetes mellitus, anorexia nervosa," s
and psoriasis. 119
111 "The heaviest adaptational load is carried by the lower-class Negroes ...
Here, not only the personal adaptation of each individual suffers, but an
endless number of vicious circles are started that can never end anywhere
because they are self-perpetuating." Kardiner & Ovesey, op. cit. supra n. 96
at 384-5; Middle and Upper Class Negroes: ". . . the obstructions to the
accomplishments of white ideals leads to increase in aggression, anxiety,
depression of self-esteem, and self-hatred. This compels him to push harder
against the social barriers, to drive himself harder, and ends with more
frustration and more self-hatred." Id. at 316.
Self-perpetuating conditions also were found regarding the Jewish
minority: Loewenstein, op. cit. supra n. 87 at 78.
112 Kardiner & Ovesey, op. cit. supra n. 96 at 305.
113 Adams, op. cit. supra n. 100 at 15.
114 Loewenstein, op. cit. supra n. 87 at 131.
115 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 304 (1944).
116 Breathlessness accompanied by a sense of fatigue, pain over the heart,
and heart palpitation.
117 Impairment of the power and function of digestion, and inflammation of
the stomach.
118 A psycho-nervous condition in which the patient loses his appetite and
systematically takes but little food, thereby becoming extremely emaciated.
119 Smith, op. cit. supra n. 115 at 217.
"Substantial numbers of persons about us certainly have subnormal re-
sistance for one reason or another, whether this is due to transient sickness,
pregnancy, chronic disease, infirmities of old age, or special susceptibility
of the nervous system or psyche. Even if such persons comprise no more
than 5-10% of the general populace, one may argue that the group is large
enough to require a prudent actor to anticipate their presence and to avoid




GROUP DEFAMATION (U. S. A.)
This human suffering is very real today! It exists because
our laws have failed to take cognizance of who was hit by the
defamation, rather than who was aimed at.120
A Possible Solution
Existent in our present laws is a legal concept which recog-
nizes mental injury. Its value for group defamation litigation is
untested, but it contains the metal for forging a powerful
weapon. The original concept of right to privacy, born in a law
review article which discussed relief afforded in defamation
cases,121 has developed, despite some opposition, 1 22 into a well-
established legal protection of individual freedom against severe
emotional distress.
One, who, without privilege to do so, intentionally causes
severe emotional distress to another, is liable for the emo-
tional distress and the bodily harm resulting.12 3
To this theory must be added the principle of foreseeability and
its relation to negligent acts. 1 24 The result of such union is a
concept which recognizes as a compensable injury the intentional
or negligent infliction of mental suffering.
Case development of this actionable tort, identified as the
"insult and outrage cases," in opposition to "fright and shock
120 Note, Arnott v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of Saskatchewan, 33
Can. B. Rev. 221-2 (1955): Riesman, Democracy & Defamation: Control of
Group Libel, 42 Columbia L. Rev. 727, 768 (1942).
121 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890)
• . . modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could
be inflicted by mere bodily injury." Id. at 196.
122 "Liability still cannot be extended to every trifling indignity . . . the
plaintiff... must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a
certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind." Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffer-
ing: a New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 874, 887 (1939).
"No pressing social need requires that every abusive outburst be con-
verted into a Tort; upon the contrary, it would be unfortunate if the law
closed all the safety valves through which irascible tempers might legally
blow off steam." Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1053 (1936).
123 Restatement of Torts (1948) Supp. §§ 46, 616, comment, expresses the
trend toward more protection in this field. Peace of mind is an interest of
sufficient importance to receive protection against intentional invasions:
Knierim v. Izzo. 22 IM1. 2d 73, 174 N. E. 2d 157 (1961).
124 In re Arbitration between Polemis, et al. and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd.,
3 K. B. 560 (Ct. of App. 1921); Palsgraf v. L. L R.R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162
N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R. 1253 (1928).
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cases,125 began with extreme cases of murder. 26 It now encom-
passes more reasonable and common examples of infliction of
mental suffering, such as a creditor's continuous stream of threat-
ening letters, 127 and an illicit solicitation of sexual intercourse.
28
Halio v. Lurie1 29 illustrates recovery of damages for conduct
which went beyond all reasonable bounds of decency, thereby
causing the victim mental anguish. The injury occurred when
the defendant received and read, in front of her family, plain-
tiff's taunting and ridiculing letter. She suffered public shame
and disgrace, and damage to her reputation, for which the New
York Court found a valid cause of action, i.e., the intentional
infliction of mental distress without physical impact.
Where, in Schuman v. Schlein,1 30 a landlord inflicted mental
distress through a series of acts designed solely to cause a sick
couple to move out, a counterclaim to this effect stated a good
cause of action. The court reiterated the concept that freedom
from mental disturbance was a recognized and protected interest
in New York State.'
3
'
A family of Puerto Ricans,132 who had contracted to buy a
home, were threatened and frightened so as to cause them emo-
tional shock, humiliation, sickness, and nervousness. The court
declared such threats, uttered only to the vendor and by him
communicated to the family, to be vicious and illegal.
Deliberate and malevolent conduct, albeit confined to
words, is at least as serious a matter, requiring the protec-
tion of the law to even a greater degree.
33
125 Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injury, 41 B. U. L. Rev. 584 (1961).
See generally, Note, 25 NACCA L. J. 116 (May 1960).
126 Knierim v. Izzo, supra n. 123; Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923
(1951), where a child was forced to watch the murder of her mother and
suicide of her father.
127 Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 242 N. W. 25 (Iowa 1932).
128 Samms v. Eccles, 358 P. 2d 344 (Utah 1961); Digsby v. Carroll Baking
Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S. E. 2d 203 (1948).
129 15 A. D. 2d 62, 222 N. Y. Supp. 2d 759 (1961). The court found support
for its decision in Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 197 N. Y. Supp. 2d
689 (1960), which concerned mental distress inflicted by receipt of salacious
mail.
130 35 Misc. 2d 581, 231 N. Y. Supp. 2d 548 (Part I) (1962); the landlord
called the tenant at extreme evening hours, threatened suit unless the vic-
tim consented to a rent increase, and installed his son and daughter-in-law
on the floor above in order to create disturbing sounds late at night.
131 Cited in Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N. Y. 2d 16, 21, 176 N. Y. Supp. 2d 996,
999, 152 N. E. 2d 249, 252, 71 A. L. R. 2d 331 (1958).
132 Ruiz v. Bertolotti, 37 Misc. 2d 1067, 236 N. Y. Supp. 2d 854 (1962).
133 Id. at 1069; Scheman v. Schlein, supra n. 130.
Jan., 1964
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss1/5
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Again, the infliction of mental suffering was a recognized com-
pensable tort.
This principle of law is being accepted elsewhere, i.e., Flor-
ida" 4 and Hawaii. 135 In Georgia,1'36 an eleven year old girl re-
covered for mental suffering and shock when threatened by a
collection agent. And in Iowa,13 a court decreed that the "in-
tent" did not have to be specifically directed at the victim if the
act was intentional and the actor could reasonably have expected
emotional distress to result.
The Iowa concepts of intent and foreseeability, together with
the general action for infliction of mental suffering, should be
molded and modified into an action designed to protect group
defamation victims. It would change the legal viewpoint from
"who was aimed at" to "who was hit"-the position which should
have been adopted long ago for such cases. In light of the med-
ical evidence about emotional distress, and realizing that no-
where else is there legal redress for such suffering, this cause of
action is a virtual necessity. Its many advantages for meeting
group defamation should be quickly realized.
Ascertainability no longer need vex the injured plaintiff
when the law looks at who was hit by group defamatory utter-
ances. The courts' "numbers game" would be finished, if the vic-
tim could establish his membership in the group and resulting
injury.
Freedom of speech, clearly, is not the issue. And the oft-
cited fear of a multiplicity of suits, the classic argument utilized
against nearly every legal advance, would resolve itself into the
problem of adequate proof.138 Additionally, the proper case de-
velopment of such a theory would place the liability for vicious
anti-democratic outbursts where it rightfully belongs, on the
heads of the hatemongers. Proof of damages could be handled
by questioning the victim directly, about the effects of being
subjected to hatred and ridicule, as was done in State of La. v.
Garrison.139
134 Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 100 S. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
135 Fraser v. Morrison, 39 Hawaii 370 (1952), wherein the court enumerated
three elements constituting an action for the intentional infliction of mental
suffering: (1) The act must be intentional, (2) unreasonable, and (3) the
actor should recognize it as likely to result in illness.
136 Delta Finance Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S. E. 2d 383 (1956).
137 Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (D. C. Iowa 1953).
138 Halio v. Lurie, supra n. 129 at 763.
139 154 S. 2d 400 (La. 1963).
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• . . Regarding medical evidence ... for the purpose of plead-
ing, an allegation of the infliction of severe mental distress is
sufficient. If there is a failure of proof of this allegation at
the trial the cause will be defeated. The capability of the
medical profession in the psychiatric field to determine if
severe mental distress has been inflicted is today recognized.
No longer are claims based upon such testimony deemed
"fictitious and speculative." 140
Conclusion
The assassination of President Kennedy has made startlingly
clear the urgency of the need for better law to check the bigots
and hate and fear peddlers. It is hardly to be doubted that his
assassin was "educated" to brutal hatred. The bigots and hate
and fear mongers, whether of the communist, fascist, or whatever
category, must be restrained by sound law. Otherwise they may
destroy our society, and, quite possibly, the world.
The present condition of America's law of group defamation,
and its evil consequences, constitute dangers to every civilized
man. Regardless of how the Supreme Court disposes of the three
cases now before it, 14 1 all containing the crucial group defamation
issue, there must be a new and sound legal answer to the ques-
tion of how an unnamed member of a large group can be legally
protected against group defamation, though no law ever can fully
compensate for the suffering it has caused.
140 Scheman v. Schlein, supra n. 130 at 552; Battalla v. State, 10 N. Y. 2d
237, 219 N. Y. Supp. 2d 34, 176 N. E. 2d 729 (1961).
141 Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P. 2d 42 (Okla. 1962), docket
#741, defamation of a football team; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273
Ala. 676, 144 S. 2d 25 (1962), docket #606, case #39, defamation of a police
force; Abernathy v. Sullivan, 144 S. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962), docket #609, case
#39, same as New York Times.
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